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From Conflict to Cooperation:
State and Tribal Court Relations in the Era of Self-Determination
Aliza G. Organick and Tonya Kowalski

he Indigenous nations1 of the United States have long been
subject to federal policy. Since the Civil Rights Era, that
federal policy purportedly has been to encourage self
determination and tribal sovereignty. One of the hallmarks of
self-determination is the development of Tribal legal systems,
which have been actively encouraged and funded by the federal
government. As a result, Tribes have been exercising their jurisdiction in ways that were not contemplated decades ago. As
Tribes have expressed their sovereignty through their court systems, it is not surprising that states sometimes feel that their
own jurisdiction is threatened. This conflict creates a need for
increased understanding, communication, and cooperation
between Tribal and state governments. The extent to which
Tribal-state cooperation succeeds or fails depends in large part
upon their ability to understand each other’s philosophical,
legal, and historical realities. Cultural barriers to communication can, if left unattended, prevent meaningful cooperation
from taking place. Historical myths and prejudices about the
First Peoples of the United States threaten to keep Indigenous
communities impoverished and marginalized. These myths
stem from first contact, and form the root of modern, antiTribal policies, legislation, and court decisions.2 If we agree that
Tribal-state relationships should evolve, we must first accept
that the historical animosity and distrust are the products of a
powerful legacy of colonization, genocide, and oppression.
Furthermore, Tribal-state tensions result from a clash of
political philosophies and differing worldviews. From the EuroAmerican standpoint, the concept of national statehood
evolved from the philosophy of natural law, as well as from the
pragmatic desire to centralize power and encourage long-distance trade.3 Modern states are also typically characterized by
large, somewhat diverse populations.4 In contrast, from the
Indigenous standpoint, sovereignty is “interwoven with the
social, spiritual, intellectual, and economic aspects of the communities they serve.”5 Historically speaking, Indigenous
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nations tended to form around kinship ties or other community-based relationships. They also tended to have “decentralized political structures often linked in confederations, and
have enjoyed shared or overlapping spheres of territorial control.”6 These differences can make it difficult for Westerners to
comprehend Indigenous sovereignty.7 Nevertheless, even by the
colonizers’ definition, Indigenous peoples of the emerging
United States were sovereign entities, and governments
engaged with them on an international basis.8 There is ample
evidence that early, pre-colonial settlers, the British Crown, and
the fledgling American government dealt with Indigenous
nations as co-equal sovereigns, recognizing that North
American lands were already occupied by Indigenous nations.9
As with any topic involving Indigenous peoples, Tribal-state
cooperative arrangements must be viewed within their historical context. History shows that the hundreds of early treaty
relationships between Indigenous nations and colonial governments recognized the potential for cooperative arrangements,
particularly in the areas of trade, building alliances, and defining territory.10 These relationships remained the status quo
while the balance of power between Indigenous peoples and
colonists remained relatively balanced. However, as the United
States grew in wealth, military might, and population, that balance of power changed.11 The colonies—and eventually the
states—coveted Indigenous territory for settlement and expansion. Before long, it became evident that the Crown could not
control its subjects in their hunger for Indigenous lands and for
gold.12 The United States Supreme Court made a decisive move
that set the tone for Tribal-state relations for centuries to come.
In the landmark case Worcester v. Georgia,13 the State of Georgia
attempted to extend its laws and jurisdiction over the Cherokee
Nation. The Supreme Court “unequivocally rejected any role
for states . . . in favor of an exclusive federal-[T]ribal relationship.”14 The Court premised its holding on inherent Tribal sovereignty vis à vis the hostile, encroaching state, but, as a matter
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of policy, clearly also wished to reserve to the government profitable trade relationships. This political sovereignty was qualified by the Court’s decision one year earlier, declaring the Tribes
to be “domestic dependent nations,” a unique brand of internal
sovereign that was neither a state nor a foreign country.15
In the era immediately following these early decisions from
the Marshall court, the federal government became the exclusive
entity to enter into formal relations with Indigenous nations in
the United States. However, this exclusivity created points of
conflict that continue to this day. Additionally, federal policy—
both judicial and legislative—has consistently eroded Tribal sovereignty, creating a paradox in Tribal-federal-state relations:
Tribes have inherent sovereignty, however limited, and yet are
continually undermined by federal initiatives to erode, assimilate, and ultimately terminate them.16 Federal erosion of
Indigenous sovereignty leaves the Tribes vulnerable to state
encroachment, furthering the process of sovereign destruction.
This cultural and historical context also frames the issue of
cooperation between Tribal and state court systems. One of the
most profound expressions of a sovereign’s power to manage
the affairs of its people is the exercise of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Historically, Tribes have always had dispute-resolution
mechanisms that expressed the cultural values of each Tribe.17
In 1934, the federal government encouraged Tribes to create
their own court systems under the Indian Reorganization Act,
but pressured them to adopt largely Anglo-American models of
jurisprudence.18 In the past few decades, Tribal courts have
experienced explosive growth, hearing complex cases and
responding to federal pressure to maintain many aspects of
Anglo-American jurisprudence, while also “crafting a unique
jurisprudence of vision and cultural integrity.”19 There are currently over 560 federally-recognized Tribes and over 250 Tribal
courts in the United States.20 As Tribal courts have grown in
number, ever more practitioners find themselves practicing in
Tribal jurisdictions on a wide variety of civil, criminal, and family matters.21 Typically, as a result of the IRA, Tribal courts have
largely Western-style legal systems, often including written
Tribal constitutions and codes, appellate courts, rules of civil
and criminal procedure, and even rules for appearance pro hac
vice. In addition to the vertical, Western form of justice familiar
to state and federal practitioners, Tribes also have rich sources
of internal common law, as well as holistic dispute resolution

bodies—both traditional and contemporary—such as
Peacemaker circles22 and Healing-to-Wellness courts.23
Just like other aspects of sovereignty, Tribal courts and their
jurisdiction have suffered from erosion by Congress and by
state and federal judicial decisions. Underlying these decisions
is the myth that Tribal courts somehow lack transparency or
even competence, especially when dealing with non-Indian
entities. This myth is reflected in the erosion of criminal jurisdiction for “major crimes” and for crimes involving non-Indian
defendants. One of the most famous examples comes from the
aftermath of Ex parte Crow Dog,24 in which the Supreme Court
reversed the North Dakota territorial courts’ negation of a Tribal
decision to resolve a homicide through a traditional form of
restitution25 rather than by capital punishment, thereby recognizing the Tribes’ right to express their sovereignty through
criminal jurisdiction. The cultural norms reflected by this more
holistic, community-centered solution were simply beyond the
ken of the non-Indigenous, territorial courts that reviewed the
decision. In fact, the Supreme Court’s holding in Crow Dog
prompted Congress to divest the Tribes of much of their felony
jurisdiction. The Major Crimes Act26 extended federal jurisdiction over an extensive list of felonies occurring in Indian country. Even today, this lack of cultural awareness and understanding continues, ironically articulated as a lack of transparency or
competence on the part of the Tribal courts.27
In this era of political, judicial, and economic growth for our
First Peoples, there is the potential for either increased conflict
or increased cooperation. Fortunately, in at least a handful of
states, Tribes and states are increasingly looking for opportunities to cooperate, and the last two decades have seen the development of a number of programs. In the legislative arena, the
National Conference of State Legislatures and the National
Congress of American Indians have joined forces to study and
promote cooperative agreements based on mutuality and
trust.28 In the judicial arena, one promising result of recent
cooperative movements has been the Civil Jurisdiction in
Indian Country Project.29 A number of Tribal-state court
forums have also begun around the country, developed largely
under an initiative by the National Center for State Courts and
National Conference of Chief Justices.30 State courts and Tribal
courts are most likely to resolve jurisdictional differences and
protect the integrity of their Native communities when they
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establish agreements recognizing comity and full faith and
credit for Tribal court judgments; possibly share resources like
jails, court personnel, and probation officers; jointly develop
legislation that contemplates cooperation on Indian child welfare, taxation, and criminal law enforcement; and promote
awareness of Tribal affairs by the state bench and bar.31 One
fruitful path for opening these intergovernmental and intercultural discussions is the listening conference. In one example,
the New York Federal-State-Tribal Courts Forum, in conjunction with several other organizations, “convened state and federal judges and court officials in sessions with tribal judges,
chiefs, clan mothers, peacemakers, and other representatives
from the justice systems of New York’s Indian Nations and
Tribes, to exchange information and learn about [their] respective concepts of justice.”32
Another way in which state courts can support Tribal courts
is by developing jurisdictional agreements to adopt a form of
Indian abstention doctrine. Although the federal Indian abstention doctrine may be eroded by the holding in Nevada v. Hicks,33
the Supreme Court has encouraged federal courts to abstain
from exercising concurrent jurisdiction in Indian country over
suits involving “reservation affairs.”34 The Indian abstention
doctrine is similar to various abstention principles between
state and federal courts.35 Arguably, state courts that have concurrent jurisdiction with Tribal courts, such as Public Law 280
jurisdiction, should exercise their discretion to abstain from
matters pertaining to Tribal lands or affairs and should mindfully employ choice of law principles to defer to Tribal court
jurisdiction where Tribal law applies.36 For example, in 2005,
the Wisconsin courts and Wisconsin-based Tribes held a conference on jurisdiction, in which they developed a thirteen-factor protocol for determining the proper forum in cases with
concurrent jurisdiction.37
This discussion has focused primarily on the state courts’
role in cooperating with Tribal communities. But Tribal-state
cooperation can also reduce conflict in legislative and executive
matters, such as taxation, gaming, natural resources, social services, policing, and so on.38 While it is generally accepted that
better relationships will emerge from increasing intergovernmental collaboration, there are also major, legitimate concerns.
The devolution of many federal-Tribal programs to state, Tribal,
and local governments creates pressure for Tribes to enter into
state compacts and contracts, and sometimes even mandates
joint programs.39 By abdicating its role, the federal government
is forcing Tribes to negotiate matters that should be reserved to
the Tribal-federal trust relationship.40
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In this era of “forced federalism,” it is critical for the courts,
as well as state and local governments, to understand that the
issue at stake for Tribes is nothing less than their sovereignty.41
Cultivating healthy Tribal-state relationships requires conscious, mindful efforts to engage in cross-cultural communication based on “mutual understanding and respect.” 42
Jurisdictional agreements and other cooperative arrangements
that support Tribal sovereignty flow back to the states in the
form of increased economic activity and social well-being.
Therefore, when the opportunity arises for courts to engage in
problem-solving across Tribal-state lines, it benefits both sovereigns, and most importantly, their people.
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